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Abstract

Social psychologists are often criticized for failing to capture the dynamic nature of
psychological processes. We present a novel framework to address this problem. The MOVE framework
contends that to comprehend complex, contradictory, and divergent patterns of thought, affect, and
behavior within changing, real-world contexts, it is necessary to undertake ecologically valid research
that is attentive to the lived experiences and meaning-making processes of culturally embedded
individuals over time. A focus on meanings, observations, viewpoints, and experiences is essential for
social psychological research that holistically captures how people construct, understand, respond,

position, and act over time within changing social, economic, and political contexts. To illustrate the
utility of our proposition, we draw on classic social psychological studies and multimethod fieldwork
during a period of rapid social and political change in Colombia during the peace process (2012–2017).
We argue the MOVE framework has the potential to advance psychological understandings of, and
contributions to, individuals embedded in real, dynamic social and political contexts. We discuss the
implications of this extended social psychological paradigm for advancing psychological science.
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Introduction

Social psychologists play a key role in understanding how the human mind processes and functions on
individual, group, and national levels. However, there is often a disjunction between the methods
employed by psychologists to study social phenomena and the multifaceted, dynamic, and temporal
realities of life. Specifically, static analyses devoid of cultural, historical, economic, legal, and political
context are often applied to complex psychological phenomena that unfold over time (Bartlett,
1930, 1958; Gergen, 1973; Hammack, 2008, 2011a, 2011b; Henriques, 2013; Moghaddam,
2002, 2013, 2018; Reicher, 2017; Reicher & Haslam, 2012; Shweder, 1991, 2003; Smedslund,
2009; Tateo & Valsiner, 2015; Wagoner, 2017; Wagoner et al., 2012). Yet, the very nature of these
contexts is dynamic, and this inherently influences cognitive, social, and behavioral processes. Periods
of rapid sociopolitical change present even greater flux for individuals, groups, and nations. Therefore,
social psychological methodologies and models must be attentive to this fluctuation to provide insights
into how people within these contexts process, think about, and respond within these changing social
realities on individual and group levels.
In this article, we detail the MOVE framework as a broad conceptual and methodological model to
guide multilevel psychological study of the mind amid dynamic sociopolitical contexts. Importantly,
what we propose would entail changes in the culture, education, and research of psychology as a
discipline, and we argue this is necessary to address deeply embedded issues the field currently faces.
The MOVE framework proposes that addressing meanings, observations, viewpoints, and experiences
improves the ecological validity of social psychological science and can be a foundation for research
more attuned to social context and its changing nature over time. First, to situate and motivate the
novel framework within the broader literature in social psychology, we examine both previous and
recent methodological crises and the conceptualizations of psychological science these crises
originated from. We discuss the contemporary replication crisis—instigated by the Open Science
Collaboration (2015) revelation that a minority of studies published in top tier psychology journals
replicate—as well as a related crisis in the 1970s concerning a lack of ecological validity in psychological
research (Faye, 2012; Hammond, 1998). We detail lessons from these crises for the conceptual and
methodological development of social psychological research. We propose an expansion of the social
psychological paradigm in light of the limitations of experimental approaches to richly capture
processes in dynamic sociopolitical contexts. In this first section, we draw on historical roots of
psychology to motivate our framework as an innovative approach to addressing issues currently critical
to the field of social psychology (Cabell & Valsiner, 2014).

Second, we outline a framework to overcome the current and pervasive problems with social
psychological research by addressing meanings, observations, viewpoints, and experiences. Applying
our framework, a more holistic, dynamic, and complete picture of social psychological phenomena can
be understood and described at different levels of analysis. Each of our four components is interrelated
and critical to our proposal to advance social psychological science. In this second section, we use
examples from classical social psychological research to illuminate the utility of the theoretical
framework.
Third, to highlight the importance and utility of the MOVE framework, we discuss its application to
contemporary social psychological research. Specifically, we provide an example of transdisciplinary,
multimethod research, in Colombia from 2012 to 2017. During this time, the Colombian government
finalized peace accords with the largest armed revolutionary group. The agreement was divisive within
the country, and discourses about the responsibility of young Colombians to be peace builders
permeated the education sector and civil society more broadly. We use a multifaceted, multimethod
study of young people’s unfolding conceptualizations of peace to illustrate the limitations of using
traditional social psychological methods in isolation and to highlight the utility and novelty of
the MOVE framework to comprehend social psychological perspectives of unfolding sociopolitical
phenomena.

Motivation: Overcoming Crises in Social Psychology

The timing and utility of our methodological review and new proposal is motivated by the current state
of social psychological science. Amassing scientific knowledge through systematic and replicable
experimental findings is the hallmark of good science (Chambers, 2017; Open Science Collaboration,
2012; Reyna, 2004). However, recent attempts to replicate some high-profile experiments, most
notably in social psychology, have failed to a larger degree than expected (Baker, 2016; Open Science
Collaboration, 2015). This incongruence between expectations of replications and the reality of nonconfirming results has, according to some, lead to the “replication crisis” in psychology. Although there
have been efforts to address these concerns, on the whole, discussions about this crisis and the
underlying issues have been fragmented (Rodgers & Shrout, 2017; Schmidt, 2009; Zwaan et al., 2018).
Multiple reasons have been given for the replication crisis in psychology. Some psychologists have
lamented the oversampling of undergraduate students from U.S. universities and the generalization of
findings from this atypical group across populations and cultures (Arnett, 2008; Henrich et al.,
2010; Sears, 1986). When replications of these results are attempted on non-WEIRD (western,
educated, industrial, rich, and democratic) samples, the results can be incongruent. This is because
although there are psychological universals, these do not necessarily manifest uniformly across time
and cultures and these nuances can be missed with applying experimental procedures in one context
to another (Henrich et al., 2010; Norenzayan & Heine, 2005; Shweder, 2010). Other researchers have
criticized scientific standards regarding p-values. Fearing too many false positives—a problem
exasperated by p-hacking (selectively reporting data and analyses) and HARKing (hypothesizing after
the results are known; see Nelson et al., 2018)—some social scientists have argued for lowering the
acceptable p-value threshold or refocusing on adequate statistical power (Benjamin et al., 2018; Szucs
& Ioannidis, 2017; Muthukrishna & Henrich, 2019). Overall, the crisis has led to many points of
contention: questions about when and if replication studies should be expected to fail; debates over

the informational value provided by replications in a field that values novel and counter intuitive
findings; issues concerning status and reputation of experiments and (failed) replications of them;
debates about the importance of direct or conceptual replications; and disagreements over deciding
when a study has or has not been replicated (Rodgers & Shrout, 2017; Schmidt, 2009; Zwaan et al.,
2018).
Most recent attempts to address the replication crisis have focused on changes within the dominant
experimental paradigm (e.g., Munafò et al., 2017; van‘t Veer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016). We support our
colleagues’ efforts to develop social psychological science who argue and advocate for the importance
of preregistering theoretically driven hypotheses, making data available on the open science
framework, increasing diversity and size of samples, and publishing replicated findings. In addition to
these endeavors, our argument in this article is the social psychological paradigm also needs to be
expanded to improve our understanding of individuals and groups in unfolding sociopolitical contexts.
We interpret the replication crisis as demonstrating the methodological limits of the current focus in
social psychology. Specifically, we argue this narrow view—predominated by laboratory and online
studies using quantitative methods within a causal framework—does not provide for fruitful and
reliable study of complex social psychological processes and phenomena in ecologically meaningful
ways within dynamic contexts.
We argue part of this disjuncture is about a lack of productive integration across methods. In an earlier
conceptual model, along with two colleagues, we addressed this by proposing the SAGE model of social
psychological research as a guide to think holistically about psychological research as a multimethod
process (Power et al., 2018). We highlighted incongruencies on an ontological level between historical
conceptualizations of complementary forms of social psychological approaches and contemporary
orientations. We proposed a mixed-methods model to combine qualitative and quantitative methods
and overcome this disjunction on a practical level. We argued for the importance of a Synthetic model,
where qualitative methods were Augmentative to quantitative methods, where they were Generative
of hypotheses where predictions could be tested experimentally, and where qualitative methods could
be used to examine Experiences that evade experiment reductionism. We argued this SAGE model was
a wise approach to conducting social psychological research to more holistically understand the
individual in context. From a similar epistemological stance that psychological phenomena require
complex, multimethod approaches, the MOVE framework identifies, and aims to solve, a different
issue in social psychological research.
That is, the MOVE framework outlines a conceptual and practical way for social psychological
researchers to more effectively study the complexity of phenomena amid dynamic social and political
contexts. One novel contribution of our proposed framework is to suggest its utilization will lead to a
greater understanding of why experiments will, or will not, replicate either directly or conceptually,
when researchers account more strongly the ecological validity of their studies. Greater understanding
and recognition of the context in which participants perform experiments—and in which experimental
results are interpreted—will allow for richer and more broadly applicable research findings, which
might aid replications either directly or indirectly by laying bare boundary conditions that is what
results are expected in what particular cultural time and context. This will aid our understanding of
what findings might be universal and others that are particular to time and place. Another novel

contribution of the MOVE framework is to go beyond static experimental analyses of complex,
unfolding, and sociopolitical phenomena. In unfolding, rapidly changing sociopolitical realities,
psychological phenomenon cannot be researched and analyzed with singular snapshots in controlled
environments. Our proposed model offers concrete guides for more productive social psychological
research in dynamic contexts.

Lessons From the Past

We draw support for this argument from the historical roots of psychology. In certain respects, the
modern crisis involving experiments reveals a disconnect with the discipline’s foundations. Wundt
(1897) in Outlines of Psychology conceptualized a two-tier psychological science. Experimental lab
psychology—focusing on manipulating variables and studying outcomes—was to be used to determine
causal inference on basic perception. The second tier of research was meant to examine complex
psychological functioning on a cultural level using complementary methodologies. Nevertheless,
Wundt’s vision of psychology was never realized. In the early 20th century, the psychoanalytic
approach to studying the human mind prized an exploration of experiences and meaning, but the
advent of behaviorism in the United States decontextualized the mind (Cabell & Valsiner, 2014; Harré
& Moghaddam, 2015; Moghaddam, 2013; Rozin, 2009). A few decades later, the cognitive revolution
reintroduced the mind to psychology as it moved beyond the reductionist and incomplete behaviorist
“stimulus followed by response” model. It served to put the complexities of the culturally situated and
mediated mind back into the psychological frame (Bruner, 1990; Shweder, 2012). Nevertheless, the
dominant conceptualization of the mind as a computer again decontextualized the study of social
psychological phenomena. The mind was seen as an isolated entity, capable of being examined
independent of the diverse contexts in which it was embedded.
Keeping with an historical perspective to ground the MOVE framework, psychology has been in crisis
before. Social psychologists in the 1970s struggled with deep and difficult questions related to
methodology, societal relevance, and theoretical and philosophical directions (see Faye, 2012). These
issues were intertwined, complex, and ultimately led to efforts to bridge the gap between research and
social psychological processes and phenomena in complicated and diverse contexts. Some social
psychologists called for methodological pluralism to overcome limitations and advance the scopes of
singular methods to investigate social scientific phenomena (Fiske & Shweder, 1986). However, as a
discipline, social psychology has moved toward a narrower attention to the individual and their
responses and behaviors, leaving contextualization to sociologists and anthropologists (Faye, 2019).
Pluralism is currently minimized in the field. Experimental manipulation of variables in
decontextualized contexts are prized (Nisbett, 2015; Reyna, 2004).
Of course, the careful experimentation of variables is essential to social psychological research. We
admire much of the groundbreaking experimental social psychological research being conducted by
our colleagues. Still, the problems of experimental decontextualization have been well documented
(Asch, 1952/1987; Power et al., 2018; Rozin, 2001, 2009). The availability of research participants via
the internet, such as by Amazon MTurk, has led to increased opportunity to run multiple experiments
and multiple iterations of the same experiment quickly and relatively cheap. These internet samples
can be beneficial: They provide a source of pilot data that can be insightful for further developing
studies and can increase sample size to bolster statistical power and reliability. However, like all

samples, online participants are limited, and not simply because of questions of diversity (Gamblin et
al., 2017; Goodman et al., 2013). One key problem is the separating of participants from ecological
valid contexts. Social psychological research often assumes the generalizability of universal principles
derived from limited samples. Although psychological universals exist, they do not manifest uniformly
across the world (Cassaniti & Menon, 2017; Norenzayan & Heine, 2005; Henrich et al., 2010; Markus &
Kitayama, 1991; Shweder, 1991, 2003; Wang, 2013). Generalizing from limited samples—particularly
those that are abstracted from ecological contexts—can be perilous because people in the real-world
process and respond to stimuli in relation to their particular ecology and understandings of it (i.e.,
emotions, thoughts, feelings, behaviors, representations, memories, and imaginings). A second key
issue with experiments is they are typically snapshot, when social phenomena are inherently dynamic.
Documenting one aspect of a process is inherently incomplete. An erroneous assumption of many
experimental social psychologists is that combining studies can reveal an accurate explanation of social
psychological processes and phenomena. In contrast, a holistic social psychology assumes the sum is
greater than the parts: Unfolding processes cannot be holistically explained using experimental
procedures. Advanced statistical methods and longitudinal studies are more nuanced in relation to the
unfolding nature of human development, but are often disconnected from experimental work (West et
al., 2004) and lack strong ecological validity (Lewin, 1943/2014; Rozin, 2001, 2009).
As social psychologists, we aim not to explain what goes on in our experiments or in numerical
representations. Rather, the goal is to use experiments and quantitative data to try to understand the
processes that explain what goes on in the real world. The first step in any good science is to map the
phenomenon: Observe what is happening to generate sound hypotheses at the start (Reicher, 2017).
But this is seldom discussed as a salient and important issue in social psychology. For example, analyses
of psychology blogs revealed psychologists are concerned with the replication crisis, statistical
significance, and science communication (Nicolas et al., 2019). However, what is not included is
revealing about the current state of social psychological science. Issues to do with meaning-making
processes, psychological observations, multiple viewpoints, and subjective experiences are neglected.
They are certainly not mainstream in research, as evidenced, for example, by a content analysis of the
three premier journals in psychology revealing no purely qualitative empirical studies in the year 2016
which are often used to capture social psychological processes (Power et al., 2018).
Social psychological science, and the study of unfolding social psychological processes and phenomena
more broadly, can advance with an implementation of the MOVE framework. A synthetic application of
mixed methods has the potential to overcome the limits of individual methods, like experimental
manipulation, and generates a framework to study processes as they unfold over time.

A Solution: The MOVE Framework to (Re)expand the Social Psychological
Paradigm

The four elements of the MOVE framework (meanings, observations, viewpoints, experiences) arise
from a divide in the physical and social world between what is quanta and what is qualia (Shweder,
1996). The quanta world is comprised of everything that is left when the world is rid of human
subjectivities. This is the world that can be studied using quantitative methods to measure, abstract,
and quantify natural phenomena. In contrast, the world of qualia is the subjective world. It is the world

humans construct, represent, reflect upon, experience, and make meaning of. Qualitative research is
based in qualia; the study of concepts, cultures, interpretations, and representations are a path to
understanding how humans think, feel, want, moralize, and value (Bruner, 1990; Cole, 1998; Markus &
Kitayama, 1991; Shweder, 1991, 2003; Wierzbicka, 1993). Human psychological processes and
phenomena cannot be conceptualized solely through a numerical focus on objects, events, and
nonsubjective processes or through decontextualized or artificially contextualized experiments in a lab.
Instead, it requires an approach attentive to the individual factors—subjective realities, interpretation,
and response—and social, cultural, historical, economic, political, and legal contexts that are inherently
dynamic and unfolding (Asch, 1952/1987; Hammack, 2008; Power et al., 2018; Rozin,
2001, 2009; Shweder, 1991, 2003).
We argue meanings, observations, viewpoints, and experiences are four quintessential components to
in-depth social psychological study in shifting sociopolitical contexts. These four components
encapsulate the essence of the world of qualia and have been specifically chosen because they are
critical and interconnected elements of social psychological research that have been de-emphasized. In
the following sections, we discuss each element of the MOVE hypotheses in more depth for conceptual
clarity. Importantly, emerging from the world of qualia, in actuality, they are simultaneously distinct,
overlapping, and connected.

Meanings

The first pillar of our MOVE framework is a focus on meaning. We use meaning to refer to how
individuals—as agentic members of groups, communities, societies, and nations—interpret and
construct norms, ideas, and attitudes in relation to their lived experiences in their social, cultural, and
political contexts (Blumer, 1986; Bruner, 1990; Hammack & Cohler, 2009; Wagoner, 2009). We propose
that social psychological research can refocus on meanings in two ways. First, a focus on meaning
suggests attentiveness to subjects’ understandings and perspectives. Concepts, definitions, and acts
cannot be assumed to be consonant with prevalent frameworks (or those from the researcher’s
cultural perspective), but must be coherent with people’s own understandings (Atran & Norenzayan,
2004; Shweder, 1991, 2003). Second, a variety of methods should be used in combination, with each
informing the others and contributing to more flexible and intricate models of social psychological
phenomena (Power et al., 2018). This element is inherently related to the first; to be attentive to
diverse perspectives and understandings, a researcher must employ diverse methods.
These concrete steps support ecological validity by drawing attention to the psychological processes
and orientations as people navigate and create their social worlds. A focus on meaning stands in
contrast to current trends and dominant approaches in social psychology. It is important to expand
beyond decontextualized experiments to better understand phenomena and psychological response as
situated in lived, dynamic realities. Without multiple methods focused on triangulating individuals’
understandings of their worlds, researchers may fall into the trap of believing they are studying one
phenomenon while their subjects hold a completely different mental framework that changes over
time (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Denzin, 2012; Fiske & Shweder, 1986; Henriques, 2013; Schiff,
2017; Shweder, 2010; Tateo & Valsiner, 2015). We propose observational methods are important to
comprehend shifts in meaning-making processes that occur in shifting sociopolitical contexts.

Meaning making is inherently a process; it occurs over time as ecological contexts change, groups form
and reform, and individuals develop along ontological life courses. We hypothesize that a refocus on
meaning-making processes that unfold over time would prioritize how people make sense of their
worlds, their experiences, and themselves (Bruner, 1990; Spencer et al., 1997; Tateo & Valsiner, 2015).
A concrete demonstration of the importance of meaning comes from early work in psychology, but
maintains clear reverberations in modern times. Discussing a famous study differentiating populations
in New Guinea with Western samples based on an experiment involving skin pricks, E. B. Titchener
(1916) pointed out the Papuans may simply have been interpreting what they were being asked to do
differently than the Westerners. He argued these respondents had a qualitatively different experience
of the task itself, rather than simply a different response to it. Shweder (2010) makes the connection
between Titchener’s critique and the issue with cross-cultural claims based on the Ultimatum Game as
an experimental paradigm. Shweder raises the question of how certain populations interpret the basic
framework of “playing a game with an anonymous other.” Social networks built on gift-giving as the
means to status, for example, may drive different responses and challenge the very construction of
what the stimuli is. In other words, “evidence of psychological differences between cultural groups
may simply (although significantly) demonstrate that different stimulus situations produce different
responses” (Shweder, 2010, p. 109). This cultural critique—levied by others as well—underscores the
variance in how the task itself is interpreted (Chuah et al., 2007; Henrich, 2000). As demonstrated in
Titchener’s historical analysis, and this modern application, the very meaning of a stimuli may be in
doubt without an attentiveness to how individuals and groups understand and think about the world.

Observations

Meaning is rooted in individuals’ lived experiences of social context, which in turn motivates our
second element, observation. By observation, we refer to the systematic study of people within their
natural contexts and everyday lives over prolonged periods of time (Geertz, 1973; Gorman et al.,
2005; Rai & Fiske, 2010). We propose observation take a primary role in social psychological science in
two concrete manners. First, we suggest ethnographic observation be more prominent in research
projects to describe and analyze meaning-making in diverse contexts over time. Second, observation
should be used to inform, and make sense of, quantitative and experimental tests of theory-driven
hypotheses (see Muthukrishna & Henrich, 2019). These two applications provide the opportunity for
greater ecological validity in investigations into the relationship between people and context, as well as
how, and why, this relationship changes over time. A focus on observation can drive research
questions and methodological choices, as well as generate data for analysis. Used in this way,
observation offers a check of external and ecological validity of quantitative and experimental findings.
In our proposed re-expansion of the social psychological paradigm, observing entails scientific and
open-minded inspection and study of actual people and their experiences, rather than applying
preconceived frameworks or assumptions to social psychological phenomena of interest. Careful and
scientifically conducted observation can help identify dissonance between research paradigms,
questions, hypotheses, and predictions, on one hand, and people’s own experiences and meaning
making on the other hand. It can highlight paradoxes, contradictions, patterns, and new behaviors that
then can be studied through appropriate instruments (Geertz, 1973; Kagan, 2012; Rai & Fiske,

2010; Shweder, 1997). This observational documentation can guide methodological and analytic
choices, while also offering rich data about how people experience the world.
By including observation, we do not simply argue for more naturalistic field studies. Rather, we
promote research and theory that treats individuals as agents operating within various and dynamic
contexts, while highlighting the need for continued naturalistic observation as dynamic contexts
develop (Cohen et al., 1996; Paluck, 2009; Paluck & Cialdini, 2014). According to the qualia/quanta
distinction outlined above, people are subjects, not objects, and should be studied as such (Power,
2014).
Again, a historical example demonstrates the utility and role of this element of our MOVE framework.
Stanley Milgram’s work on obedience has become a pillar of introductory psychology courses and
permeated popular understandings of obedience to authority. Decades of iterations and replications
have suggested individuals are capable of violent actions beyond what they imagined they would do
when prodded by an authority figure. This plethora of studies has also identified cultural and
contextual factors that facilitate or hamper these actions (Blass, 1999). Yet, this prolific area of inquiry
began with an observation.
In “Eichmann in Jerusalem” Hannah Arendt introduced the concept of the “banality of evil” (1963).
Based on her observations of the Nuremburg trials, she noted how Eichmann, who had been
responsible for murdering millions of Jewish people during the Holocaust, was not a senseless
monster. Instead, she observed he was simply following orders and divorced himself from personal
responsibility for the genocide. By fragmenting responsibility, he separated himself from blame. Thus,
the “banality of evil” concept was coined to describe this phenomenon. Following observations of the
trial of Eichmann, and Arendt’s conceptualization of the “banality of evil,” Milgram began to wonder
about questions of when and how people followed orders, which held profound implications for
thinking about morality and accountability (Milgram, 1974). Although Milgram ultimately began to
explore these questions in a laboratory setting, the motivation began with careful observation of the
real world.

Viewpoints

Viewpoints, the third element of our proposal, is derived from a number of theoretical perspectives.
We draw on cultural psychological theory emphasizing how individuals and cultures co-constitute each
other (Cole, 1998; Shweder, 1991, 2003), positioning theory highlighting how people within these
cultures position themselves in relation to others (Harré & Moghaddam, 2003), and social
representations theory illustrating how individuals represent their social worlds from their unique
positions (Moscovici, 1961/2008). With viewpoints, we prioritize attentiveness to two aspects of social
life: The many varied ecologies in which individuals—research participants and researchers—are
embedded, as well as how positions and social representations change over time (Bronfenbrenner,
2009; Gillespie & Cornish, 2010). We assert true ecological validity in social psychological research
necessitates multiple methods and studies to attend to, meaningfully capture, and triangulate this
diversity and mutability (Denzin, 2012; Henriques, 2013; Munafò & Davey-Smith, 2018).
Viewpoints is connected to meaning, but they are separate pillars of our proposal. Although meaning
draws attention beyond outcomes and quantitative measurements to include social psychological

processing and interpretation, viewpoints is about recognizing and addressing the range of
perspectives and social contexts. Viewpoints situates meaning and lived realities within cultural and
historical frameworks. Subjects and researchers have positionalities tied to their identities, societies,
social groups, and lived experiences. Therefore, viewpoints complements meaning by proposing an
awareness and attentiveness to this human and ecological diversity.
This third pillar can boost validity by enriching understandings of social psychological processes at
different levels of analysis. Validity is a multifaceted concept that has been discussed in scientific
research for almost a 100 years and in psychology for nearly as long (Hathaway & McKinley,
1943; Remmers et al., 1927). Generally, it refers to measuring what is purported to be measured
(Brewer, 2000; Lewin, 1943/2014), but also incorporates many elements researchers must consider,
such as internal, external, construct, concurrent, and predictive. Viewpoints can bolster ecological
validity through attention to the social positions and representations of diverse groups of people. In
the early stages, attention to varied viewpoints can help in the conceptualization and design of studies.
Awareness of various social worlds and the corresponding stimuli can drive testable research
hypotheses (Shweder, 2010). This same focus can guide the development of experiments and
protocols that are valid within the setting they are applied. Viewpoints can thus boost ecological
validity by leading to findings that are more applicable and reliable in actual, lived realities (Brewer,
2000; Lewin, 1943/2014).
The object of study, however, is not the only challenge to validity involved in a narrow approach.
Psychological researchers must think about the viewpoints embedded in methodological approaches
and ourselves as researchers in varied, interconnected contexts (Bronfenbrenner & Ceci,
1994; Langdridge, 2008). Each researcher carries their own disciplinary lens, personal experiences, and
cultural frames. No research can be absolutely devoid of epistemological positioning, but a lack of
awareness to this may omit other important perspectives. A focus on viewpoints also entails reflection
on the ways that a researcher’s own stance, background, and approach may affect validity. In
suggesting this focus, we recognize there is much discussion and debate currently over whether
research is inherently value neutral or not (Duarte et al., 2015). We wish simply to raise attention to
the positionalities of researchers and promote greater attention to what diverse viewpoints offer
psychological study.
For example, in a classic study of the diffusion of knowledge over time, Moscovici traced how the new
and increasingly popular phenomenon of psychoanalysis was understood, experienced, and
represented by different groups across French society (Moscovici, 1961/2008). He was interested in
individual and group viewpoints concerning this unfamiliar phenomenon. The research showed how
different social groups and mass media constructed and reformed knowledge about psychoanalysis as
it spread throughout French society given their unique sociocultural values and beliefs. Catholics
conceptualized psychoanalysis as a supplement to, but not a replacement of, confession. However, a
sexualized representation of humanity was rejected as incompatible with teachings of the Catholic
church. In contrast, communists completely rejected psychoanalysis because they viewed it as being
on the wrong side of their dichotomized worldview. French liberals, including liberal media, accepted
the novel practice, as it was congruent with their ideologically expansive worldview.

By investigating how social groups made the unfamiliar familiar, Moscovici provides a social
psychological model for considering how people made meaning of, and ultimately experience (or not),
a novel phenomenon from their particular sociocultural viewpoints. In fact, partly from this
work, Moscovici (1981) developed a theory of social representations to frame the iterative coconstruction of individuals and collective understandings based on affiliations and group dynamics. As
such, considering viewpoints with ecologically valid methods (qualitative and quantitative) that
followed a process of diffusion over time allowed for an understanding of how knowledge in society is
transformed. This classic investigation provides an example congruent with the MOVE framework
because it illustrates a multimethod, ecologically valid, way to examine an unfolding social
phenomenon on individual and group levels over a prolonged period of time.

Experiences

The final element is experiences, by which we refer to the thoughts, feelings, and actions of people. In
other words, we use experience in reference to the agency of individuals amid changing social,
political, and historical contexts (Geertz, 1973; Shweder, 1996). Experiences are the integrative result
of meaning making processes, observations about the social world, and people’s articulation and
embodiment of viewpoints. To this end, stimuli—such as a social event, context, or moment—the
meaning attributed to it, and individual’s response to it all encompass their “experience” as a holistic
phenomenon encompassing more than just their fully conscious processing of lived realities. This
definition takes a more holistic view than focusing just on the stimuli, a behavioral response, or
affective outcomes. Experience is complementary to meaning, observations, and viewpoints. Meaning
highlights interpretation and psychological response should be considered, observations entails how
people position themselves in the world, and viewpoints incorporates multiple perspectives that must
be considered. Bringing this all together, experience draws attention to contextualizing meaning
making within dynamic individual and social trajectories.
With experience, we propose two elements to refocus social psychological research. First, it is critical
to move beyond deterministic frames that directly link contexts to outcomes (Kagan,
2012; Moghaddam, 2013; Valsiner & Chaudhary, 2017). Our framework prioritizes exploring and
understanding what comes between contexts and outcomes; that is, how changing stimuli are
received, integrated, and responded to. Second, social psychological research should be situated within
ontological and historical development to truly understand the ways that events, trends, dynamics,
and narratives in social contexts influence individual and collective psychologies (Bruner,
1990; Hammack, 2008, 2012; Shweder, 1991, 2003).
Measuring experience can be challenging. Simply asking individuals to describe experience ignores
evidence that memory and consciousness can only partially explain social psychological phenomena
(e.g., Velmans, 2000). This is why we situate experience as part of our broader, integrative model. We
argue experience is a necessary focus of social psychological research and understandings, and it is
through observation and attentiveness to diverse viewpoints and how people make meaning of their
social worlds—as studied with multiple measures—that we can understand lived-experiences.
System justification theory, for example, asserts people who live in dictatorships generally do not
revolt because they have a need to maintain the status quo to ensure individual psychological stability.
An impressive oeuvre of correlation and experimental studies support this theory (for a review,

see Jost, 2019). Yet, recent ethnographic work challenges this assumption. Research in dictatorships
presents an alternative perspective based on understanding people’s lived experiences in these
settings (Moghaddam, 2013, 2016). People are not necessarily driven to justify unfair systems. They
are often acutely aware of injustices and unfairness within these systems. Ethnographic research and
other empirical evidence reveal they do not revolt because of fear (Adra et al., 2019). Citizens in
dictatorships are afraid of punishment to them or their families in the form of torture, imprisonment,
beatings, arrest, or death at the hands of secret police. An alternative account of this social
psychological phenomenon was developed by understanding the lived experiences of people over
prolonged time periods through observing and studying their viewpoints and meaning making in
complex sociopolitical contexts using ecologically valid methods.

The Integrated MOVE

Although we have separated the four elements of our MOVE framework to provide detail and rationale
for each, as the examples from social psychology show, the elements are also interdependent. All four
are deduced from a conceptualization of the world of qualia: the world of subjectivities, cultures,
interpretations, and representations. A focus on meaning should be tied to ecologically valid
measurements and studies rooted in observation. A better grasp of meaning making processes from
the viewpoints of diverse samples facilitates understanding lived experience. Observation provides a
tool for understanding the complexity, variance, and nuance of how context is experienced, as well as
the researcher’s own phenomenology. Multiple methods can be used to test and check ideas
generated via naturalistic observation when applied in synthesis with this reflection on the
researcher’s cultural frameworks (Henriques, 2013). Finally, we can better understand people’s
individual and collective experience of stimuli by observing how people—across various cultures and
perspectives—make meaning, respond, and behave over time (Tateo & Valsiner, 2015).
Our MOVE framework thus comes together: capturing the dynamic and ecologically embedded nature
of human minds would be strengthened by research projects that explore lived experience that is
attentive to multiple viewpoints and address individual’s processes of psychological meaning through
using naturalistic observation at various stages of the process.
MOVE is not simply a rearticulation of mixed methods, but rather an epistemological orientation with
concrete steps that can extend the current social psychological research paradigm. Engaging with the
broad concept of research that is sensitive to meanings, observations, viewpoints, and experiences, it
is possible to generate finer grained, ecologically valid hypotheses. These hypotheses in turn can lead
to specific predictions about social psychological phenomena, which may be empirically tested
experimentally, and in conjunction with other methods, to develop social psychological theories to
understand unfolding processes of sociopolitical change.
We propose the MOVE framework can serve as a guide for addressing multiple challenges, such as
studying the dynamic interaction between individuals and cultures and having methods that are
flexible, integrative, and capable of addressing sociopolitical change (Bruner, 1990; Shweder,
1991, 2003; Valsiner & Chaudhary, 2017). Specifically, MOVE should be implemented as a guiding
framework: Its elements can be drawn on in conceptualizing holistic research projects, as well as
developing research questions, generating testable hypotheses, planning methodologies for data
collection and analysis, and interpreting results. Each of these stages requires ecological validity if the

broader research is to meaningfully address dynamic social phenomena that unfold over time.
The MOVE framework is thus an approach to research, with the four elements playing out concretely in
orientations, choices, and motivations in the social psychological study of inherently dynamic
phenomena. The framework can be applied to how individuals, groups, and nations understand and
experience dramatic sociopolitical change.

MOVE in Practice: The Case of Colombia

An example of how the MOVE framework can be applied to effectively study a dynamic context is the
peace process in Colombia from 2012 to 2017. During this time, the Colombian government and the
oldest armed guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP),
negotiated 300-page accords to end over five decades of armed conflict. Although the peace talks
garnered the international spotlight, the process also involved concerted efforts to change the broader
narrative of Colombia as a violent country. A focus of these efforts was educating and calling on young
people to be active peace builders. Young Colombians received messages and classroom lessons urging
them to be politically and socially active in building peace, but placing the success of this societal effort
on their shoulders (Sánchez Merteens, 2017). Many frameworks were presented to these young
people about how they should think about peace. Furthermore, the peace process divided the
electorate when put to a vote, which highlighted the role of young people—and their
conceptualizations of peace—in creating and maintaining prolonged peace in Colombia. Research
examined, using multiple methods, as the peace process was unfolding, how Colombian youth in their
localized contexts thought about peace and themselves (Velez, 2019; Velez et al., 2019). The research
exemplified integrating attention to meaning (of young Colombians and as part of their psychological
development), observation (of the changing social context, education about peace, protests and peace
movements), viewpoints (incorporating multiple methods and perspectives, while epistemologically
maintaining an attentiveness to Velez’s own positionality), and experience (of peace, efficacy as
citizens, and societal change). Overall, the Colombia example and the questions it raises broadly
represent a common and important challenge for social psychologists: How can we best study the
complexities of individuals in context as sociopolitical phenomena unfold in real world settings,
especially ones of broad societal change?
In line with our MOVE framework, the investigation in Colombia began with prolonged and informal
observation, which was then further developed into scientific study. As a teacher during the beginning
of the peace process, Velez engaged in naturalistic observations: discussions with fellow teachers,
witnessing peace-related school and district events, and talking with students. This raised questions
about how young people themselves were thinking about conflict, their country’s historical and future
trajectory, and themselves. These initial observations were further developed with more structured
observation. Velez returned numerous times to participate and observe peace education curriculum
development, and youth activities and demonstrations related to peace process. These experiences,
across multiple years, were intentionally chosen to understand and learn about peace discourses and
education across various sectors and actors in Colombia. All in all, this set up demonstrates the
iterative and flexible nature of MOVE: Continued observation and integration of various viewpoints as
macrolevel events develop is necessary to effectively situate the investigation of the social
psychological phenomenon of question.

The MOVE framework guided the research itself as a multimethod process that took place over several
years. Velez began by exploring how youth were experiencing Colombia’s peace process and broader
social and political trajectory. A first part of this puzzle involves understanding broader changes in
youth attitudes. To this end, Velez drew on international data sets to examine changing youth civic
attitudes in Colombia, which found evidence that even as young Colombians became more
disillusioned with the traditional political system, they were not detaching from political engagement
(Velez & Knowles, in press). This finding provided a background context for understanding how youth
constructed meanings of peace; the quantitative data set is static, yet revealing, and a more dynamic
framework was needed to investigate how this finding, coupled with the naturalistic observations,
related to young Colombians’ development as citizens.
The quantitative analysis provided a broader glimpse of how young people were experiencing this
context, but in line with MOVE, more richly understanding this experience required attention as well to
meaning and diversity within viewpoints. At two time points—just before the accords were finalized
and after they had begun to be implemented—more than 320 adolescents across Colombia were
interviewed about the peace process, their thinking about peace, and how they understood their
possible contributions to peace. In a semiexperimental procedure, participants were also presented
with excerpts from the government’s proposed peace education curriculum, and asked to respond
(Velez, 2019, in press). Finally, a smaller subset of participants was interviewed 3 years in a row. This
additional consideration over time helped understand the how young people’s ideas about peace
might shift with their own developmental trajectory, as well as changes in the peace process. Themes
in their answers were also compared with a discourse analysis of government speeches and documents
prior to the interview data collection to situate young Colombians’ meaning making within a broader
discursive context.
Following MOVE, this approach allowed not only to explore abstract meaning making, but how it
connected to lived experience. The research also involved attention to a diversity of viewpoints, as well
as the multiple conceptions young people may be cognitively processing at the same time (e.g., an
abstract idea, their interpretation of lived experiences, an understanding of their own efficacy).
Focusing on how young Colombians experienced the peace process and discourses demonstrated their
own ideas reflected broader discourses, but then were adapted to fit their own understandings of
themselves and their society. Addressing meaning making in relation to lived experiences, drawing on
this element of MOVE demonstrated they held nuanced ideas about peace that influenced their civic
action and changed dependent on context. Speaking abstractly, they often mirrored government
discourses saying peace began internally in each person, but as other contexts, conversations, and
responses were considered, they demonstrated changing ideas about its possibility and their own
efficacy to contribute to peace based on external, systemic issues like corruption, violence in other
places, and their own developmental challenges.
An application of the MOVE framework in the Colombian case demonstrates an attentiveness to
people’s meaning (conceptual understandings and cognitive processing), observations (of the various
educational contexts and movements about peace), viewpoints (analyses of various forms of data,
from multiple sources and socioeconomic groups, over a prolonged period of time), and how
adolescents more broadly experienced the peace process and social context with a focus on the ways

they related their own identities to it. Although this example is particular in its historical, cultural,
social, economic, and legal context, the application of the MOVE framework highlights the importance
for social psychological conceptualizations of thoughts, feelings, viewpoints, and behaviors in unfolding
sociopolitical contexts.

Conclusion

We propose the MOVE framework to comprehend complex patterns of thought and behavior within
dynamic, real-world contexts. It is grounded in the assertion that it is necessary to undertake
ecologically valid research of unfolding social psychological processes, particularly during periods of
rapid societal and political change. Meanings, observations, viewpoints, and experiences lie at the
heart of understanding social psychological processes at individual, group, and national levels. The
decontextualization of research and the reification of the experiment as the dominant means of inquiry
in social psychology are limited (Asch, 1952/1987; Rozin, 2001, 2009). In isolation, paradigmatic
approaches may be fundamentally at odds with the dynamic and unfolding experiences of individuals
in their social contexts. Social science research must employ approaches capable of studying
movement and processes of change, and we propose our MOVE framework to address this challenge
in social psychology.
With MOVE, we push for social psychology to move beyond a limited orientation that
compartmentalizes different parts of the human experience to different disciplines. Under such a
framework, social psychology should focus on stimuli, response, and behavior as rooted within an
individual. These processes are decontextualized, leaving the day-to-day world and social context to
sociologists and anthropologists to investigate (Faye, 2012, 2019). We argue, however, that to truly
study and understand the human psyche—inherently and deeply interconnected with cultural and
social context (Bronfenbrenner, 2009; Moscovici, 1981; Shweder, 1991)—in an ecologically valid way,
social psychology must face head on the dynamic nature of lived experiences. MOVE provides a
framework to try accomplish this goal.
There are distinct advantages to studying psychological reactions over time amid changing political and
social dynamics by using locally meaningful, ecologically valid, multiple methods that are close to
observed thoughts, feelings, and actions of people in their contexts. First, it describes and explains the
phenomena of interest as it develops over time. Second, it helps generate more precise hypotheses
and predictions that can be further understood on a general level using ecologically valid experiments.
Failure to replicate ought to inform the scopes of generalizability and/or boundary conditions of the
phenomena. This is because social psychological experiments occur within specific ecological contexts.
A greater understanding of the parameters of these contexts will inform our understand of why, or
why not, an experimental finding does or does not replicate, either directly or conceptually. Third, it
provides a framework for conceptualizing social psychological processes. The Colombian case, for
example, informs our comprehension of how young people in transitional contexts relate to peace and
related discourses as they make meaning based on their various viewpoints and experiences. But more
broadly, it illustrates how individuals, as part of social groups and nations, comprehend and act in
shifting economic and sociopolitical conditions. We invite other researchers to utilize our framework,
to test whether it indeed provides greater insight in to the ecologically valid study of how individuals in
context understand and make meaning of their sociocultural and political worlds.

Importantly, however, we are not proposing simply a rejection of quantification and laboratory studies.
Instead, the framework is a broader, more holistic orientation that addresses the limits of the
experimental method (as highlighted by the contemporary and previous replication crisis) and
quantitative-only approaches. The application of the laws of experimentation and use of quantitative
methodologies are essential (Chambers, 2017; Reyna, 2004). Yet, it would be inappropriate to solely
apply these to study the qualia world of subjectivities (Shweder, 1996). The world of meaning making,
observation, multiple viewpoints, and lived experiences is often difficult to understand solely in a
laboratory (Power, 2011; Shweder, 1996, 2010). This world is inherently dynamic: people, societies,
political landscapes, discourses, and environments constantly change. Laboratory experiments often
offer snapshots, and quantitative studies may miss the dynamic ways that people respond based on
context, continuity, and change in their sociocultural, political, and economic contexts. They are
important methodologies, but cannot be the only ones used in isolation.
An application of the MOVE framework has implications for social psychological science. The
replication “crisis” is one of the discipline’s major issues at the moment (Baker, 2016; Open Science
Collaboration, 2015; Schmidt, 2009). The MOVE framework has the potential to develop social
psychological science by advancing approaches to understand processes; that is, through attention to
meaning-making and lived experiences in context and as changing over time via observations and
multimethod research projects. It also prioritizes reflection on researchers’ own schema and
positionality, as well as incorporating broad and diverse samples. These elements increase ecological
validity, which in turn reveals boundary conditions of experimental investigations (i.e., an
understanding of the scopes and limits of a context in which an experimental procedure is likely to
replicate or not), or demonstrations of social phenomena (Paluck & Cialdini, 2014). In this way,
the MOVE framework illustrates the scopes and limits of the experimental method to describe,
comprehend, or predict the dynamics of social psychological phenomena. Replication, when integrated
with other methods and used in relation to MOVE, can be one part of triangulation to test and develop
social psychological theories (Denzin, 2012; Munafò & Davey-Smith, 2018).
The MOVE framework is not without its challenges, and these should not be understated. Conducting
research that focuses on meanings and experiences that unfold in shifting contexts is time consuming,
requires expertise in diverse methods, may be difficult to publish, has implications at multiple levels of
analysis, and may produce incongruent or contradictory results. Decontextualization and reification of
the experiment in psychology presents obstacles to studying social psychological processes over time.
These issues are deeply embedded in the field: in training, in research, in what is prized in publication,
and in underlying philosophical orientations. In the face of these difficulties, there are potential
benefits for social psychologists to understand and utilize contextualized and integrative approaches.
To engage with the big issues facing the world—inequalities and injustices, economic hardship,
conflict, populism—we need significant paradigmatic advances to bridge the gap between our research
and the impact it has. Although we have proposed MOVE to advance social psychological research, we
also believe in the importance of greater discussion across disciplines to construct more nuanced and
insightful frameworks of the mind. We believe our proposed framework can extend social psychology
and even bridge disciplines, and we welcome further extension and development both within
psychology and across the social sciences.
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